Day: June 17, 2025

OpenAI CEO Sam Altman took to the stand in front of Congress, testifying on the future of AI regulation at Capitol Hill. During his hearing, he spelled out the truth about the limits of how far we can take AI: “The cost of AI will converge to the cost of energy.”

AI is often framed as a purely digital phenomenon, operating seamlessly in the intangible realm of codes and algorithms. But behind every image generated, every response crafted, lies a significant and measurable energy cost. The technology we all use relies on minerals, chips, semiconductors, and data centers where your data is being churned and processed. Technology requires energy to power it, and the extraction of scarce minerals to build it. So, as we think about accelerating technology, what lies ahead is not just a computational challenge, but an infrastructural and ecological one.

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Despite AI’s promise as a technology with unlimited and infinite potential, there is a very real limiting factor to its growth. In his testimony, Altman skipped the fluff: “Eventually, chips, network gear… will be made by robots, and we’ll make that very efficient and cheaper and cheaper, but an electron is an electron.” This is a fundamental economic principle that will shape AI’s future. As AI manufacturing processes become increasingly automated and optimized, the variable costs of hardware production will steadily decline. What remains immutable is the physics of computation itself: the energy required to power these systems. In a mature AI economy, the marginal cost of intelligence will approach the marginal cost of electricity. This creates a direct relationship between energy innovation and AI capabilities; regions with abundant, reliable, and affordable energy will gain decisive advantages in computational power.

Energy is the primary limiting factor to innovation. Some estimates suggest the U.S. will need up to 90 additional gigawatts, about 90 nuclear power plants to power data centers. The nations or companies that can generate clean energy at scale will effectively set the ceiling on what’s possible in artificial intelligence. There are two methods the U.S. must adopt to build an energy-efficient AI infrastructure and lead the global AI race: measure AI emissions at scale and treat energy policy and AI policy as intertwined, as opposed to separate interests.

Carbon footprint represents the most comprehensive metric we have for quantifying the true future cost of AI systems. However, OpenAI and other major companies do not disclose how carbon-intensive their models are, leaving users in the dark about their AI energy. Despite the lack of transparency, data scientists have found nearly precise ways to estimate the carbon cost of various popular models. In the first week after OpenAI released its image generation tool, users created 700 million images. Each image uses about 7 watt-hours of electricity. Together, that’s more than 5 million kilowatt-hours—roughly the same amount of energy 24,000 U.S. homes use in a week. Organizations that measure and optimize for carbon efficiency now will gain crucial advantages as regulations tighten and energy costs fluctuate. As energy becomes the limiting factor in AI advancement, carbon intensity directly translates to economic competitiveness. While today’s market may not fully price environmental externalities, forward-thinking policies and market pressures increasingly will.

By implementing carbon accounting and reporting frameworks for AI operations today, companies and governments can establish the measurement infrastructure needed to drive meaningful optimization. These metrics provide essential visibility into not just where energy is being consumed, but how efficiently it’s being utilized across model training, inference, and supporting infrastructure.

I recently worked with a major advertising technology company and the experience illustrated this principle in action. When they migrated from CPUs to GPUs, our measurements revealed a 62% reduction in carbon emissions and 55% less water usage—significant efficiency gains achieved through precise measurement and targeted infrastructure changes. This clearly demonstrated how another path forward is possible. And it starts with tracking and optimizing. Starting this measurement process immediately allows organizations to identify optimization opportunities, establish performance baselines, and develop the organizational capabilities needed for sustainable AI leadership.

According to the Carbon Disclosure Project, “Failure to tackle climate-related risks in supply chains costs nearly three times more than the actions required to mitigate these risks.”  Businesses and governments investing in AI infrastructure today must also invest in ways that sustain innovation for generations to come. As incredibly ambitious AI projects take hold, we have no option but to supercharge innovation to support the most efficient models. The race for artificial intelligence supremacy may ultimately transform into a race for energy supremacy, with the most significant breakthroughs coming not from Silicon Valley’s software engineers but from innovations we can make in using AI more sustainably. 

In a Senate Commerce Committee hearing with Altman in May, Senator Ted Budd (R-NC) said, “The ability for the U.S. to deploy new energy generation capacity and upgrade its grid is in many ways the key to the race against China. Energy is how we can win and it’s also how we can lose.” According to the International Energy Agency, China is already a global leader in renewable energy, set to account for almost half of the world’s total renewable power by the end of the decade. While the U.S. is hyper-focused on competing with China’s AI models, to effectively compete and lead global AI we also need to lead in operational AI capability. Energy and AI are inextricably linked; this approach must be reflected in our policy. 

And while transitioning to renewable energy is crucial for sustainable AI development, scaling renewable energy infrastructure to meet AI’s exponentially growing demands will require decades of coordinated investment and policy alignment. We simply cannot afford to wait that long. To adequately respond to the rush of demand today, we can start to spot and mitigate inefficiencies by first capturing the carbon and water footprint of generative AI.

The Artificial Intelligence Environmental Impacts Act of 2024, out of Massachusetts, is one of the first bills that sets out to align our AI ambitions with our energy realities, calling for the development of comprehensive measurement and reporting tools that take into account the full range of AI’s environmental impact. 

Without concerted action now, we risk embedding wasteful practices into the foundations of an economy increasingly powered by AI. We must adopt a policy-forward strategy to incentivize energy-efficient data centers through consistent measurement, tracking and demanding efficiency where it exists.

Last week, Sam Altman laid out his vision for how AI can transform humanity by the 2030s, and he reiterated the possibilities that lie ahead: “[Intelligence and energy] have been the fundamental limiters on human progress for a long time; with abundant intelligence and energy (and good governance), we can theoretically have anything else.”

There’s no doubt that the cost of AI is energy. Let’s make sure it’s sustainable.

In late April, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order that many international onlookers viewed as a startling provocation: he directed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to expedite its process for issuing commercial deep sea mining permits in areas beyond U.S. jurisdiction.

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This was hardly Trump’s first time making brazen claims with respect to lands beyond U.S. borders. The president’s unilateral declaration of U.S. authority over the mineral-rich stretches of the international seabed comes in the wake of inflammatory statements about annexing or controlling foreign territory—from Canada to Greenland to the Panama Canal.

Trump’s offshore minerals order makes no direct territorial claims. But in asserting U.S. authority to regulate commercial seabed mining on the high seas, Trump seeks to bypass an international regulatory regime many decades in the making. In so doing, he threatens to destabilize international oceans governance. History suggests the move may prove counterproductive, undermining concrete American interests in the name of rushing into a speculative new extractive frontier.

Scientists first discovered deep sea deposits of manganese, copper, cobalt, and nickel in the form of potato-sized nodules in the 1870s. Yet, for nearly a century, the mining industry took little notice. Seabed nodules were located at profound depth and pressure; extracting them was therefore a complex and capital-intensive process. Interest in commercial recovery began only in the 1960s, when Space Age technologies and Cold War resource anxieties made deep sea nodule harvesting seem both possible and worth the effort.

After World War II, a wave of decolonization across Africa, Asia, and the Pacific impeded the Western powers’ access to resources once under colonial control. Mining boosters argued that the deep sea could provide a crucial alternative to terrestrial mineral markets controlled by potentially unfriendly postcolonial governments. With mining now technically feasible, the U.S. and other industrialized nations rushed to explore these vast, untapped mineral reserves.

Read More: What to Know About Trump’s Push to Boost Deep-Sea Mining

The desire of industrialized nations to take advantage of this new mineral frontier prompted questions about whether countries could help themselves to these resources on a first-come, first-served basis, or whether ownership rights belonged to the international community writ large.

In 1970, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the latter position, declaring that the international seabed and its vast mineral wealth represented “the common heritage of mankind.” Developing nations saw deep sea nodule fields as a source of vast wealth that could be distributed to benefit poor and “geographically-disadvantaged” nations.

The U.S. balked. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations pushed back against the attempt by developing countries to impose onerous regulatory and redistributive provisions on deep sea mining. 

Even so, the U.S. expressed a commitment to multilateralism and to the development of a comprehensive ocean governance agreement. In 1974, when a mining CEO wrote to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asking for U.S. recognition of his company’s claim to a stretch of seabed in the middle of the Pacific, the State Department refused. The U.S., the Department explained, supported the creation of an international legal regime and would not issue any unilateral recognition of mineral rights in international waters.

But by the late 1970s, as negotiations over a treaty dragged on, Congress grew receptive to industry lobbyists seeking legislation that would protect their investments in mining sites beyond U.S. maritime jurisdiction. 

In 1980, lawmakers passed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA). This obscure law vested NOAA with the authority to issue permits for mining beyond American jurisdiction until an international regime was put in place. Its drafters intended the law to be an interim measure, one that would soon be superseded by an international treaty.

But in 1981, the Reagan Administration upended what were known as the law of the sea negotiations and withdrew U.S. support for the draft treaty over disputes about the deep sea mining provisions. The conservative administration saw the centralized management of seabed mining and associated redistributive principles as problematically socialist and anti-industry.  

This objection didn’t prevent negotiators from completing the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) the following year. However, the U.S. became one of only four nations to vote against the adoption of the treaty. 

President Bill Clinton eventually signed the UNCLOS implementing agreement in 1994, when the treaty entered into force. But Congress never ratified it, despite the U.N. General Assembly approving changes that directly addressed the U.S.’ deep sea mining concerns.

In the three decades since, leaders across the aisle have argued that not signing onto the treaty was a mistake. The U.S. views most treaty provisions as customary international law, and thus effectively legally binding. But as a non-party, it has been sidelined when it comes to multilateral negotiations over U.S. claims to the extended continental shelf in the oil-rich Arctic. Additionally, the U.S. has had no direct voice in negotiations over the international seabed mining regime.

Even so, until the 2010s, the fact that the Deep Sea Hard Mineral Resources Act remained on the books mattered little in practice. While it authorized the U.S. to unilaterally issue licenses to mine the international seabed area, no major confrontations occurred because nobody really wanted to mine the seabed anymore. Commodity prices had fallen and companies discovered that many initial estimates regarding deep sea mining costs and profitability had been overly optimistic. By the mid 1980s, the companies that had pushed for the DSHMRA no longer saw deep sea mining as particularly commercially attractive. 

Then came the so-called “clean energy transition.” By the mid-2010s, it was clear that the trend toward electric vehicles and other renewables would drive enduring demand for batteries. This spurred renewed interest in deep sea nodules, which contain the nickel, copper, and cobalt required for lithium-ion battery production.

Interest in—and opposition to—deep sea mining surged in the early 2020s after the government of Nauru triggered a legal provision demanding that the ISA finalize a regulatory regime and allow commercial-scale mining to move forward after decades of limited “exploratory” ventures.

Read More: The Economics of Deep-Sea Mining Don’t Add Up

Scientists, conservation organizations, and a growing cohort of national governments responded by calling for a moratorium on deep sea mining, in light of significant risks posed to marine ecosystems and insufficient knowledge of how mining might impact deep sea environments.

This controversy has delayed the finalization of regulations that would permit commercial mining to move forward. These delays at the ISA, in turn, have frustrated corporate actors, like The Metals Company (TMC), which are keen to commence commercial-scale operations in international waters.

Enter Trump. American efforts to unilaterally assert regulatory authority over areas of seabed claimed by the international community are not new. But Trump’s executive order is particularly inflammatory as he doubles down on a U.S. position that many across the political spectrum view as outdated, despite growing international alarm over the potential adverse impacts of mining.

Unlike in 1980, when the DSHMRA was first promulgated, there is now a treaty regime in force with respect to the international seabed that enjoys nearly universal acceptance. The ISA is working to finalize a regulatory regime that will govern if and how such mining should go forward. 

The most charitable interpretation of Trump’s order would be to view it as a helpful prod to ISA negotiators to come quickly to an agreement and to get an international regulatory regime off the ground.

But the move can also be seen as yet another tack away from internationalism, and an indication of ultimately self-defeating contempt for international norms and institutions. By showing disregard for the international regime governing the seabed, the U.S. provides moral cover for other countries—including adversaries—to do the same.

Moreover, the “untapped wealth” of the seabed has always been a somewhat chimerical notion, with states tending to overestimate the value of these resources while underestimating costs associated with their extraction. At best, the benefits of deep sea mining are speculative. 

Trump runs the risk of duplicating the mistakes of the Reagan Administration, which jeopardized the negotiation of a wide-ranging international treaty vital to U.S. national interests, like freedom of navigation, in an effort to cater to private industry actors who quickly abandoned deep seabed mining projects as economic conditions shifted.

History suggests that prioritizing a speculative new extractive frontier over international ocean governance institutions could end up doing far more harm to American interests than good.

Sonya Schoenberger is a PhD Candidate in History at Stanford University, where she researches decolonization and marine resource governance in Oceania.

Made by History takes readers beyond the headlines with articles written and edited by professional historians. Learn more about Made by History at TIME here. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.

As the war between Israel and Iran rages on for a fifth day, it is unclear whether the Trump Administration is preparing to intervene militarily. On Monday, U.S. forces were sent to the Middle East, ostensibly for “defensive” purposes, as Donald Trump left the G7 summit early and warned Tehran to evacuate.

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But whether the U.S. gets more involved than it already is, some members of Congress from both parties argue, is not a decision that should be up to the President.

Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) announced plans to introduce a resolution on Tuesday that asserts the requirement of Congress’ approval if Trump wants to commit armed forces to military action in the region.

“This is not our war. But if it were, Congress must decide such matters according to our Constitution,” Massie posted on X.

The resolution has already gained the support of progressive Rep. Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.), who replied “Signing on” to Massie’s post.

It’s also not the first proposal by a lawmaker seeking to limit U.S. military engagement in the conflict. 

Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) introduced a war powers resolution in the upper chamber on Monday that would terminate the unauthorized use of U.S. armed forces against Iran, given that there has not been a declaration of war, which only Congress can issue. War powers resolutions are “privileged,” meaning that the Senate is required to promptly debate and vote on the resolution.

“I am deeply concerned that the recent escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran could quickly pull the United States into another endless conflict,” Kaine said in a statement. “This resolution will ensure that if we decide to place our nation’s men and women in uniform into harm’s way, we will have a debate and vote on it in Congress.”

Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) also introduced a separate bill, cosponsored by Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), on Monday that would prohibit the use of federal funds for “any use of military force in or against Iran” without congressional approval, with the exception of self-defense.

“Another war in the Middle East could cost countless lives, waste trillions more dollars and lead to even more deaths, more conflict, and more displacement,” Sanders said in a statement. “I will do everything that I can as a Senator to defend the Constitution and prevent the US from being drawn into another war.”

While the measures seeking to constrain Trump are unlikely to pass in the Republican-majority House or Senate, proponents have said that they want to force lawmakers to show where they stand on an issue where the public has been very clear. According to a University of Maryland poll in May, before Israel launched its strikes against Iran last Friday, only 14% of U.S. respondents across political parties supported “Military action in attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.”

“It’s time for every member to go on record,” Khanna posted. “Are you with the neocons who led us into Iraq or do you stand with the American people?”

What the Constitution says

War powers are divided between Congress and the President, according to the Constitution. While the President is named the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, only Congress has the authority to decide whether the U.S. should go to war—either a total war or more limited uses of force. The President retains inherent defensive powers to use military force without congressional authorization if the U.S. is attacked, but congressional approval is still needed for a prolonged war.

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 provided further guidance on the President’s war powers, including that the President must have congressional approval for the use of force abroad except for certain circumstances like safely removing troops or rescuing Americans overseas. 

Nevertheless, the executive branch has expanded its view of the President’s defensive war powers, most notably with its interpretations of the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations of Use of Military Force (AUMF). Congress passed the 2001 AUMF after the September 11 attacks to allow the use of force against entities that “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” in the attacks or “harbored such organizations or persons.” The 2002 AUMF authorized military action against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq government “to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and was used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

But the authorizations have been criticized for effectively giving Presidents a “blank check” to direct military actions without congressional approval far beyond their original intended scope. There have been multiple unsuccessful efforts by both parties to repeal the authorizations, including by Kaine in 2023 with the support of then-Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), who said at the time: “I think the fact that you have a lot of Republicans who are very skeptical of continuing to provide a blank check here I think is a good sign.”

When Trump in his first term authorized the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, Defense Department general counsel explained at the time that it distilled the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to direct military action into a broad two-part test: first, “whether the President could reasonably determine that the action serves important national interests,” and second, whether the military action does not necessarily “bring the nation into the kind of protracted conflict that would rise to the level of a ‘war.’”

Party splits

Conflict with Iran has divided Democrats and Republicans—not along party lines but within them.

While some “America First” voices have rallied against direct U.S. involvement, Trump’s MAGA camp also includes war hawks like Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), who has said on X that, if negotiations fail, the U.S. should “go all-in to help Israel finish the job.”

“If diplomacy is not successful, and we are left with the option of force, I would urge President Trump to go all in to make sure that, when this operation is over, there’s nothing left standing in Iran regarding their nuclear program,” Graham said on CBS on Sunday. “If that means providing bombs, provide bombs. … If it means flying with Israel, fly with Israel.”

Nine lawmakers led by Rep. Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.), a pro-Israel Democrat, signed onto a letter imploring Trump to apply “crushing diplomatic pressure in addition to Israel’s military pressure” on Iran towards zero nuclear enrichment.

Trump, who also faces pressure from Israel to join the war, has continued to urge finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict, but he’s also expressed the possibility of U.S. involvement if Iran retaliates against U.S. targets.

“If we are attacked in any way, shape or form by Iran,” Trump posted on Truth Social on Saturday night, “the full strength and might of the US Armed Forces will come down on you at levels never seen before.”